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Natural disasters could constitute a major shock to public 
finances and debt sustainability because of their impact 
on output and the need for reconstruction and relief 
expenses. This paper uses a panel vector autoregressive 
model to systematically estimate the impact of geological, 
climatic, and other types of natural disasters on 
government expenditures and revenues using annual data 
for high and middle-income countries over 1975–2008. 
The authors find that, on average budget, deficits increase 
only after climatic disasters, but for lower-middle-income 
countries, the increase in deficits is widespread across all 
This paper is a product of the Private & Financial Sectors Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region. It 
is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development 
policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The authors may be contacted at mmelecky@worldbank.org. and craddatz@worldbank.org.  
events. Disasters do not lead to larger deficit increases 
or larger output declines in countries with higher initial 
government debt. Countries with higher financial 
development suffer smaller real consequences from 
disasters, but deficits expand further in these countries. 
Disasters in countries with high insurance penetration 
also have smaller real consequences but do not result 
in deficit expansions. From an ex-post perspective, 
the availability of insurance offers the best mitigation 
approach against real and fiscal consequences of disasters.How Do Governments Respond after 










Natural  disasters  could  constitute  a  major  shock  to  public  finances  and  debt 
sustainability because of their impact on output and the need for reconstruction and relief 
expenses. This paper uses a panel vector autoregressive model to systematically estimate 
the impact of geological, climatic, and other types of natural disasters on government 
expenditures and revenues using annual data for high and middle-income countries over 
1975-2008. The authors find that, on average budget, deficits increase only after climatic 
disasters,  but  for  lower-middle-income  countries,  the  increase  in  deficits  is  widespread 
across all events. Disasters do not lead to larger deficit increases or larger output declines 
in  countries  with  higher  initial  government  debt.  Countries  with  higher  financial 
development suffer smaller real consequences from disasters, but deficits expand further 
in  these  countries.  Disasters  in  countries  with  high  insurance  penetration  also  have 
smaller  real  consequences  but  do  not  result  in  deficit  expansions.  From  an  ex-post 
perspective, the availability of insurance offers the best mitigation approach against real 
and fiscal consequences of disasters. 
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1.  Introduction  
Recent  observations  suggest  that  natural  catastrophes,  especially  the  climatic  ones,  are 
increasing both in intensity and frequency. UNEP (2005) stresses that the world is facing an 
increasing  frequency  and  intensity  of  disasters  that  have  had  devastating  impacts  based  on 
figures reported by the secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction that the 
ten years prior to 2005 have seen 478,100 people killed, more than 2.5 billion people affected and 
about  US$  690  billion  in  economic  losses.  Hoppe  and  Grimm  (2008),  form  the  Geo  Risks 
Research Department of MunichRe, document that there have been indeed increasing signs that 
the steady advance of global warming is progressively affecting the frequency and intensity of 
natural catastrophes. 
In addition to their direct costs, usually measured in terms of damages, casualties, and 
output  losses  (Raddatz,  2009;  Rasmussen,  2004),  natural  disasters  have  the  potential  to 
constitute a major issue for public finances and debt sustainability in particular (Borensztein et 
al., 2008; Rasmussen, 2004; International Monetary Fund, 2009; Inter American Development 
Bank, 2009; World Bank, 2003; World Bank, 2001). The reconstruction of public infrastructure 
destroyed by a disaster requires increases in government expenditures at the same time that the 
contraction  in  economic  activity  may  reduce  government’s  ability  to  gather  resources  from 
standard tax collections. Furthermore, governments facing large disasters may need to mobilize 
resources to provide emergency relief, aid, and social safety nets to those individuals directly 
affected by these catastrophes. While international aid may help mitigate some of the immediate 
consequences of disasters, the amounts involved are usually smaller than the tens of billions that 
a large disaster may cost and are not promptly available.  
The consequences of disasters for public finance and debt sustainability will depend on 
the  nature  of  the  government’s  reaction  to  the  disasters.  Whether  governments  respond  to 
disasters by increasing expenditures to provide reconstruction and relief after a natural disaster 
will  depend  on  their  capacity  to  gather  resources  by  increasing  fiscal  revenues  or  borrow 
resources from domestic or international sources, or benefit from previously contracted fiscal 
policy insurance or other hedges. In absence of these financing options, the governments’ only 
option would be to maintain or even decrease the level of expenditures, limiting its ability to 2 
 
provide reconstruction and relief and potentially increasing the economic consequences of the 
disaster.  The  route  followed  by  different  governments  concerning  the  combination  of 
expenditures, revenues and borrowing will likely depend on the access to lending, its cost, and 
on the demand for government services. For instance, countries that can borrow at low cost and 
face the burden of reconstruction and relief may prefer that route to increasing revenues through 
taxation or restraining expenditures. And countries where private insurance markets share a 
large fraction of the reconstruction costs (e.g. by financing the reconstruction of private and 
public capital) may focus on emergency relief, face smaller funding requirements, and expanding 
expenditures moderately.  
This  paper  estimates  the  impact  of  natural  disasters  on  fiscal  sustainability  by 
characterizing how government expenditures and revenues typically respond to different types of 
disasters,  and  how  these  responses  relate  to  a  government’s  ability  to  borrow  and  to  the 
availability of private financial sources for private and public reconstruction. Following Raddatz 
(2009), we do this by estimating  the parameters of a Panel Vector Autoregression (PVAR) 
model  that includes real output, government expenditures, government revenues, measures of 
the occurrence of geological, climatic, and other disasters, as well as other external shocks and 
standard  macroeconomic  variables  like  inflation  and  interest  rates.
1  The  three categories of 
natural disasters  we consider follow Skidmore and Toya (2002 ) and are defined as follows : 
geological  disasters  including  earthquakes,  landslides,  volcano  eruptions,  and  tidal  waves; 
climatic disasters including floods, droughts, extreme temperatures, and windstorms; and other 
disasters  including  famines,  epidemics,  insect  plagues,  wild  fires,  miscellaneous  accidents, 
industrial accidents, and transport accidents. 
Using the parameters of the model we can predict the dynam ic response of each of the 
variables of interest to the occurrence of any type of disaster  the same year the disaster occurs 
and in the years following the disaster. We estimate the model using annual data  for high and 
middle-income countries during the pe riod 1975-2008. While low-income countries are also of 
interest, data availability and the importance of aid flows for government financing makes them 
                                                           
1  These  types  of  models  use  the  cross-country  dimension  of  the  data  to  increase  the  power  of  the 
estimation of time series models, and have been routinely used when short time series data is available, as 
it is the case in this paper. 3 
 
hard to compare to countries that participate more actively in international financial markets. 
We identify the response of all variables in the model to the occurrence of each type of natural 
disasters by assuming that these disasters are acts of God whose occurrence is exogenous to a 
country’s economic conditions.  After estimating the average fiscal responses to disasters of all 
countries in the sample, we contrast the responses of different country groups based on income 
levels, financial development, and insurance penetration. The contrasts allow us to test whether 
differences in these country characteristics that proxy for a country’s ability to borrow and for 
the  availability  of  non-governmental  sources  of  funds  for  reconstruction  are  associated  with 
different fiscal behaviors and macroeconomic costs of disasters. Crucially, when comparing the 
responses of countries across groups we also control for differences in income levels across these 
groups.
2  
We find that while, for middle- and high-income countries, all three types of disasters 
appear to cause GDP declines, none of the effects is  well statistically estimated. However, we 
observe clear consequences for the fiscal stance after climatic disasters. These consequences are 
due to expanding expenditure  (by 15%) and declining revenue  (by 10%) after these episodes. 
While governments try to proac tively attenuate the impact of climatic disasters, they incur 
significant budget deficits (increase by 25% from initial levels) . The GDP impact of climatic 
shocks is indeed the smallest as a result. Governments do not respond with a fiscal impulse 
using  deficit  financing  after  a  geological  disaster  and  this  seems  to  end  in  higher  real 
consequences for these disasters. This lack of an offsetting fiscal impulse could be driven by 
government preferences or simply a constrained fiscal space,
3 and we try to shed some light on 
the merit of these two interpretations by further controlling for initial debt levels and financial 
                                                           
2 We also characterize the different responses across regions in additional results. 
3  Perotti  (2007)  puts  forth  two  essential  features  of  fiscal  space  that  we  will  use  in  our  discussions 
henceforth. First, fiscal pace is determined by the intertemporal government budget constraint and some 
notion of fiscal sustainability. This means that in order to increase some type of government expenditures 
at present one needs to either reduce other expenditures now or in the future, or increase current or 
future revenues or inflate away existing nominal debt. The ability to increase debt levels in a sustainable 
manner is thus consistent with having fiscal space available. Second, if one type of expenditure has a 
higher social marginal return than another and the same cost, resources should be moved from the second 
to the first type of expenditure. 
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market development. It appears that initial debt levels do not constrain a government’s fiscal 
space available for disaster response in our sample, for which we conjecture that in this sample 
high initial debt levels proxy for better access to capital markets. Further, financially developed 
countries are found to always strongly increase government expenditures after the disasters (by 
55%).  While  deficits  increase  relatively  more  in  financially  developed  countries  (by  75%  as 
opposed to 10% in less financially developed countries), the resources that an efficient financial 
system  can  mobilize  may  help  dealing  with  the  economic  consequences  of  disasters  more 
effectively. The output loss for financially less developed countries appear to be 2 to 10 percent 
of  GDP  versus,  on  average,  no  significant  loss  for  financially  more  developed  countries.  In 
contrast,  countries  with  high  levels  of  insurance  penetration  can  deal  with  the  economic 
consequences of disasters without engaging in deficit financing of expenditures.  
In addition to quantifying the impact of natural disasters on output and fiscal variables 
for different groups of countries, our analysis leaves three main messages concerning the use of 
fiscal-policy financial instruments.  First, one needs to  be careful when associating high debt 
levels with a government’s limited ability to borrow. A country’s stock of debt is the equilibrium 
outcome of supply and demand factors. Countries with high debt levels may be those that face a 
larger supply of loans. For those countries, debt levels proxy for a good access to credit rather 
than a tighter credit constraint. In our sample of high- and middle-income countries, this seems 
to  be the case. Second,  countries with more developed financial markets or more developed 
insurance markets suffer less from disasters (smaller output declines). However, the way they 
achieve it differs in both cases. In financially developed markets, governments are able to raise 
funds and increase deficits. Presumably, this response helps alleviate the impact of the disasters. 
Thus, it seems that governments in financially developed countries have better access to debt 
markets  to  attenuate  shocks.  In  contrast,  in  countries  with  high  insurance  penetration,  the 
smaller impact of disasters occurs without an important fiscal expansion. Countries with smaller 
insurance markets expand deficits more, yet still suffer more from disasters. The availability of 
insurance seems to reduce the real consequences without requiring an increase in fiscal burdens. 
It  seems,  therefore,  that  while  overall  financial  development  helps  deal  with  disasters,  the 
prevalence of insurance does it in a more efficient ex-post manner. Of course, properly weighting 
these  two  options  requires  an  explicit  consideration  of  the  costs  of  both  strategies:  the  net 5 
 
present  value  of  interest  costs  associated  with  further  borrowing  from  the  financial  system 
versus insurance premium costs, which is outside the scope of this paper.  
Given  the  recent  emphasis  on  the  use  of  insurance  related  strategies  to  deal  with 
disasters (catastrophe insurance); it is useful to discuss the implications of our results for this 
strategy. Although our results relate to insurance penetration in the private sector, we believe 
that fiscal insurance policies could have a similar positive hedging effect and help enhance the 
disaster  relief  response  and  reconstruction  and  further  diminish  the  real  consequences  of 
disasters in a fiscally sustainable manner. The reason is that, in our results the availability of 
insurance seems to dampen the impact of disasters by taking some of the losses and helping the 
government to focus fiscal expenses on the remaining un-hedged risks. This mechanism should 
also apply to fiscal insurance.  
If this is the case, governments could avoid jeopardizing fiscal sustainability after natural 
disasters by purchasing financial products that transfer and disperse some of the financial risks 
from the natural disasters into financial markets. However, challenges in pricing and cost-benefit 
analysis concerning these products often leave countries hesitant to use them, assuming they will 
be able to meet the financial costs of disasters with their current expenditures and the help of 
official  aid.  Nevertheless,  recent  experience  suggests  that,  despite  these  challenges,  countries 
would like to arrange for some risk transfer mechanism as part of their climate-change risk 
mitigation strategies (Borensztein et al., 2008).  The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 describes the data and section 3 explains the estimation methodology. Section 
4 presents and discusses the estimation results including for subgroups of countries based on 
income levels, regional location and financial deepening. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Methodological Approach 
We estimate the impact of natural disasters on output and fiscal variables across countries using 
a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) model that relates the variables of interest to its lagged 
values, and to  contemporaneous and lagged indicators of the occurrence of various types of 
natural disasters. For a given country, the baseline specification of the model corresponds to 6 
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where  , , , , ( , ), i t i t i t i t x TT y TT     is  the  (growth  of)  a  terms -of-trade  index,  and 
, ,, ,, , ( , ) , , , i t i t i i t i t i t t INF R REV y EXP GDP     is  a  vector  of  endogenous variables  that  includes  the 
(log of) real government expenditures (EXP ), GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US dollars) 
(GDP), the inflation rate (INF ), nominal interest rate (R ), and government revenues (REV ). 
The main focus of the paper is on EXP , GDP and REV , but we include inflation and interest 
rates in the y  vector as controls for other macroeconomic conditions. This set includes all the 
conventional macroeconomic variables typically included in macro models (see Monacelli (2005), 
Linde  et  al  (2008),  and   Adolfson  (2001),  among  others).  The  vector 
,, , , , ( , , ) i t i t i t it D GEO CLIM OTH      includes  variables  capturing  the  occurrence  of  geological, 
climatic, or other disasters, as described in the next section. The parameters  i   and  t   are 
country  and  year  fixed-effects  that  capture  long  run  differences  in  all  the  variables  across 
countries, and the impact of global factors that are common to all countries in the sample and 
can be understood as the world business cycle. The coefficient  i  captures a country-specific 
trend and is included when the model is estimated in levels only (see below). The residual term  
, it corresponds to an error term that is assumed i.i.d. The number of lags,  q , is assumed to be 
equal in both summatories. Relaxing this assumption does not importantly change the results. 
The parameters of the model are matrices, denoted by  j A , and the structural interpretation of 
the results depends on the identification of the parameters of the contemporaneous matrix  0 A . 
Note at this point that we do not include government deficit explicitly as a variable into the 
model. The model includes logs of expenditure and logs of revenues, which are by definition 
always positive. The logged government deficit is then constructed from the evolution of these 
two  variables  and  the  shares  of  expenditures  and  revenues  in  the  deficit  in  the  sample  of 
countries. 
The main identification assumption of this empirical strategy is that the occurrence of 
natural disasters is exogenous. They are assumed to be acts of God that are unrelated to any 
present or past economic variable. Identifying the impact of other shocks in the model requires 
additional and more controversial assumptions. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that the 7 
 
terms-of-trade  do  not  respond  to  the  y   variables  at  any  lags,  but  probably  have  a 
contemporaneous  and  lagged  effect  on  them,  which  is  equivalent  to  imposin g  a  diagonal 
structure in all the  A matrices. For the developing and small developed countries included in 
this  study,  these  assumptions  should  be  uncontroversial.  The  assumption  is  more  debatable 
when including developed countries, but the assumption is maintained to ease comparison across 
groups of countries and specifications.  
The fiscal variables are included in the  y  vector because they are likely to respond to a 
country’s macroeconomic performance, and are identified by assuming a contemporaneous causal 
order among the variables that is given by their position in the vector. This means that the  0 A  
matrix of contemporaneous relations among the  y  variables is assumed  block-triangular, which 
corresponds  to  assuming  that  output,  inflation,  interest  rates  and  revenues  respond 
contemporaneously to changes in expenditures, but government expenditures respond to changes 
in a country’s economic conditions and fiscal revenues only after a year.  Similarly, revenues are 
assumed to respond contemporaneously to changes in expenditures, GDP, inflation, and interest 
rates,  but  these  variables  respond  to  shocks  to  revenues  only  with  a  one  year  lag.  The 
assumptions  on  the  ordering  of  the  fiscal  variables  relative to  GDP  are  similar to  those in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ilzetzki et al (2010), but the use of annual data makes them 
more  controversial.  While  one  may  reasonably  argue  that  expenditures  are  planned  on  an 
annual basis and do not respond to a contemporaneous quarterly innovations in GDP, assuming 
that they do not respond to innovations to GDP within the calendar year is more extreme. 
Nevertheless, this should not be a problem for the identification of the conditional response of 
fiscal variables and output to the exogenous shocks, which is the main focus of this paper. The 
ordering of inflation and interest rates relative to output also follow the standard ordering in the 
monetary policy literature (Christiano et al. (1998)). As in the case of the fiscal variables, the 
identification of structural shocks to these variables based on causal order with annual data is 
controversial but should not affect the identification of the impact of the disaster shocks, which 
is the focus of this paper. The identification assumptions translate in the following matrix of 
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Similarly, the model restricts the  j B  matrices so that disasters do not affect a country’s terms 















The structure of the other  j B  matrices is analogous.  
The model described in equation (1) correspond to a PVAR, because they assume that 
the dynamics, represented by the different parameters and matrices, are common across the 
different cross-sectional units (countries) included in the estimation, which are indexed by  i . 
This is a standard assumption in this literature (see Broda (2004); Ahmed (2003), Uribe and 
Yue  (2006))  because,  given  the  length  of  the  time  series  dimension  of  the  data  (around 20 
annual observations), it is not possible to estimate country-specific dynamics unless we reduce 
importantly the number of exogenous shocks under consideration, the number of lags, or both. 
However,  as  noticed  by  Robertson  and  Symons  (1992),  and  Pesaran  and  Smith  (1995),  this 
assumption  may  lead  to  obtaining  coefficients  that  underestimate  (overestimate)  the  short 
(long) run impact of exogenous variables if the dynamics differ importantly across countries. 
We estimated the parameters of equation (1) for the cases where the series are trend 
stationary in levels and stationary in differences (with drift). The reason is that standard panel 
unit root tests offer little guidance on what model is more appropriate. The results of those tests 
are  summarized  in  Table  2,  which  presents  summary  statistics  for  standard  unit  root  tests 9 
 
performed on a country-by-country basis, as well as results from the Levin et al. (2002) panel 
unit root test. For most variables, the fraction of countries where the hypothesis of a unit root 
cannot be rejected is high, but in most cases the panel unit root test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root for the series in levels.  For the series in differences, the fraction of 
individual countries where the unit root hypothesis is rejected and the panel unit root tests 
strongly reject the hypothesis of a unit root. Thus, there are arguments for estimating the model 
in both forms. The bulk of the discussion below focuses on the model in levels because the 
confidence  bands  for  this  model  were  more  precisely  estimated  because  more  information  is 
preserved for the estimation when employing levels of variables rather than their differences. 
However, we will also discuss the results in differences for the baseline estimation and, while we 
will not report the model in differences for all exercises for reasons of space, the results are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those obtained for the model in levels. Furthermore, 
even when estimating the model in levels, the interest rate will be included in first differences. 
The reason is that, although panel unit root tests reject the null of a unit root, when included in 
levels this series exhibits explosive non-stationary behavior in some specifications.
4 
For  the  version  of  the  model  in  dif ferences  we  also  tested  for  the  possibility  of 
cointegration using Pedroni (1999)'s test for cointegration in panels.  Although  the various 
statistics proposed by Pedroni (1999) yield somewhat ambiguous results, in most cases the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected (see Table 3). Moreover, Pedroni (2004) shows 
that for the sample characteristics that are closer to those used in this paper (N larger than T) 
the panel-rho test, which systematically cannot reject the null of no cointegration,  has the best 
size and power properties. Consistently, the model in first differences will be estimated without 
a cointegration relation.  
Standard lag tests suggest estimating the model including two annual lags (Schwartz 
information criterion). Three annual lags are also considered for robustness.  
The parameters of the two versions of the model, estimated in reduced form by SURE 
are used t o recover the impulse -response functions (IRF) of per capita GDP , government 
                                                           
4 This occurs in a few estimations for groups of countries by region. In these cases, the impulse response 
functions do not converge back to zero within a 20 year window.   10 
 
expenditures and revenues, and the resulting budget deficit to each of the structural shocks 
using the variance-covariance matrices of reduced form errors derived from these coefficients.
5 
The confidence bands for the IRF come from parametric bootstrapping on the model assuming 
normally distributed reduced form errors. 
 
3.  Data 
To conduct the analysis we collected data on the incidence of disasters and several measures of 
macroeconomic  and  fiscal  performance  for  middle  and  high-income  countries.  Low-income 
countries  are  not  included  because  their  fiscal  expenditures,  revenues,  and  overall  debt  are 
typically related to official and multilateral aid support. Therefore, the fiscal responses to shocks 
are likely to differ qualitatively from those of other countries and depend on exogenous aid 
allocation. 
Data for natural disasters were obtained from the Emergency Disasters Database (EM-
DAT) maintained by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (2008) (CRED). 
This is a comprehensive database that includes data on the occurrence and effects of over 12,800 
mass-disasters in the world since 1900, and is compiled from a diversity of sources. As a general 
principle, to enter into the database an event has to meet any of the following conditions: there 
are ten or more people reported killed; there are 100 or more people reported affected; a state of 
emergency is declared; or there is a call for international assistance.  
The data contain information on various types of disasters that following Skidmore and 
Toya  (2002),  we classify  in  three  broad  categories.  Geological  disasters  include  earthquakes, 
landslides, volcano eruptions, and tidal waves. An important characteristic of this type of events 
is their unpredictability and relatively fast onset. The second category is climatic disasters. This 
category  includes  floods,  droughts,  extreme  temperatures,  and  windstorms  (e.g.  hurricanes). 
                                                           
5  The  use  of  SURE  is  standard  for  the  estimation  of  the  reduced  form  equation.  It  is  equivalent  to 
estimating the model equation by equation by OLS, but is more efficient because it takes into account 
contemporaneous correlations among variables. It also directly estimates the variance-covariance matrix of 
reduced-form residuals. We use only the two-step version of the estimator for reasons of speed, but when 
iterated until convergence the SURE estimators are equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimators.     11 
 
Compared to the previous category, some of these disasters can be forecasted well in advance 
(so precautions can be undertaken) and have a relatively long onset. The final category is a 
residual  group  that  includes  famines,  epidemics,  insect  plagues,  wild  fires,  miscellaneous 
accidents, industrial accidents, and transport accidents.  
In each category, the incidence of disasters is measured by counting the annual number 
of events that classify as large disasters according to the following criteria established by the 
International Monetary Fund (see Fund (2003)): the event either affects at least half a percent 
of a country's population, or causes damages to the capital stock, housing, human lives, etc. of 
at least half a percent of national GDP, or results in more than one fatality for every 10,000 
people.
6 The relative intensity of disasters is not explicitly captured in our analysis as we use a 
threshold indicator and then assume that in each disaster category the intensity is similar or 
averaged within the category.
7    
Starting from this variable, we also  construct a different measure that not only counts 
the number of disasters but also takes into account the month of the year when a disaster 
occurs, in a manner similar to Noy (2009). This allows disasters occurring early in the year to 
have a different contemporaneous impact than those that happen near the end of the year. This 
is basically a re-normalization of the incidence measure described above, since just counting the 
number of disasters yields an estimation of the output costs of a disaster occurri ng at the 
sample mean date during the year. Taking into account the date of occurrence, produces an 
estimate of the output cost of a disaster occurring January 1st. 
                                                           
6 Note at this point that this threshold identification of significant disasters does not mechanically imply a 
decline in GDP, also some relationship with GDP dynamics could exist. This is because the identification 
threshold looks at the destroyed stock of wealth and production factors rather than the flow of income. 
GDP is used here as a scaling variable. 
7 While we cannot completely control for the  disaster’s size, we do separate small and large disasters. 
Thus, only variation in intensity among large disasters is being ignored. Further, the concern that two 
episodes  may  have  completely  different  impact  because  of  their  intensity  and  location  is  partially 
controlled by imposing that disasters affect a minimum number of people and cause a minimum damage 
to capital and wealth. Thus disasters that occur in the middle of the desert are not considered as disasters 
under  our  measure.  Nonetheless,  future  work  should  attempt  to  consider  the  disaster’s  distance  to 
populated centers.. 12 
 
Data on macroeconomic performance, fiscal stance, and other types of external shocks 
(used as controls in part of the analysis) come from various sources. Real GDP per-capita is 
measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars and obtained from the Bank (2008) World Development 
Indicators  (WDI).  The  terms-of-trade  index  is  the  ratio  of  export  prices  to  import  prices 
computed using the current and constant price values of exports and imports from the national 
accounts component of the Penn World Tables (version 6.1) and updated using the terms-of-
trade data from WDI.  
Data on government expenditures and revenues come from WDI, IFS, and EIU. Data on 
total government debt come mainly from Panizza et al. (2008), complemented with data from 
WDI, IFS, and EIU. Government expenses are cash payments for goods and services incurred by 
the  government,  including  wages  compensation  and  interest  payments.  Revenues  include 
receipts from taxes, social contributions and fees, excluding grants. Data on a country’s CPI and 
inflation rate come from WDI. Official assistance and grants are not included in our analysis so 
that expenditure and deficit are measured before grants. This is an advantage considering that 
movements  in  them  may  generate  movements  in  deficits  that  are  not  related  to  fiscal 
sustainability. Official assistance is not included separately as a variable due to its unavailability 
for developed countries that constitute a major part of our sample. 
Finally,  data  on  money  market,  discount,  and  deposit  interest  rates  come  from  the 
International Monetary Fund (2010) International Financial Statistics. To increase the cross-
country coverage of our sample, we select from the three definitions the interest rate series with 
the longest spell during the sample period, with preference for the money market rates when two 
or more series had the same coverage. Summary statistics for these variables for the sample of 
countries during the period of analysis are presented in Table 1. To improve coverage on all 
macroeconomic and disaster variables, the final sample used in the econometric analysis below is 
restricted to the post Bretton Woods, 1975-2006 period. 
Table 2 takes a first look at the data by comparing, within the sample, the average 
macroeconomic  performance  in  years  with  and  without  disasters.  The  results  show  that 
expenditures  grow  slightly  faster  in  years  with  Geological  and  Climatic  disasters,  but  not 
significantly so. The year of a geological disaster, expenditures grow 5.6 percent on average, 
compared  to  only  2.6  percent  for  the  remaining  years.  However,  both  averages  have  wide 13 
 
dispersion and a two sided test rejects the hypothesis that those two averages are identical only 
at  the 12 percent level. The differences are much smaller and also insignificant for climatic 
disasters, which result in expenditure growth of 2.7 percent, compared to 2.6 percent for the 
average year without a climatic disaster. On the revenue side, revenue growth is also higher in 
the year of a geological disaster than in other years (4.4 versus 3.1 percent, respectively), but is 
lower in the year of a climatic disaster than in a normal year (2.4 versus 3.3 percent). These 
unconditional comparisons show only a small increase in the fiscal deficit  during a disaster. 
However,  a  proper  estimation  of  the  impact  of  a  disaster  on  any  macroeconomic  variable 
requires  conditioning  on  the  behavior  of  other  variables,  as  well  as  global  fluctuations  in 
economic activity. The methodological approach outlined in section 2 takes care of that.      
4.  A Brief Discussion on the Impact of Disasters on Expenditures and 
Output 
The impulse responses that we will present in the next section summarize the response of the 
key  variables  included  in  the  VAR  (output,  government  expenses,  and  revenues)  to  the 
occurrence of a large natural disaster. As such, each one of them conveys information on the 
evolution of the whole system of variables after a shock, and on the full set of relations among 
variables. These interactions may lead to some apparently unintuitive results that are useful to 
discuss at this stage.  
First, note that from a theoretical point of view, the impact of a disaster on economic 
activity is ambiguous. A disaster may destroy capital and other factors of production, reducing 
the amount of output that can be produced with a given amount of labor. However, it also 
makes  people  inter-temporally  poorer,  increasing  the  incentives  to  work  through  a  standard 
wealth effect. The final response of output depends on which of these effects dominate. Further, 
consider  the  response  to  a  disaster  of  a  simple  system  that  includes  only  output,  fiscal 
expenditure, and fiscal revenue. Assume that initially the disaster leads to a decline in output, 
an increase in expenditure, and that revenue passively follows output. After the initial impact, 
the  evolution  of  each  of  these  variables  will  depend  on  their  contemporaneous  and  lagged 
relations. In particular, in this example the sign and magnitude of the expenditure multiplier 14 
 
will  play  a  crucial  role.  If  an  increase  in  expenditures  leads  to  an  increase  in  output,  this 
multiplier  effect  will  dampen  the  initial  output  decline  resulting  from  the  disaster.  If  the 
multiplier is large enough, output  may actually end up increasing shortly after the disaster 
instead of declining. Thus, in this example, it is possible to  obtain small and even positive 
responses of output to disasters depending on the impact of the disaster on expenditures and the 
relation between expenditures and output. It is also possible that a disaster will not lead to an 
increase in government expenditures if a government does not have the fiscal space for deficit 
financing. In such a case, expenditures will not react immediately to the shock but follow the 
declining  revenues.  Depending  on  the  sign  and  magnitude  of  the  fiscal  multiplier,  this  may 
reinforce  or  dampen  the  response  of  output.  Of  course,  if  revenues  do  not  follow  output 
passively, the final behavior of all variables will also depend on the impact of a disaster  on 
revenues  and  the  relation  between  revenues  and  output  and  expenditures.  Also,  if  other 
variables are added to the PVAR their behavior should be considered when tracing down the 
impact of a shock.  
These simple examples highlight that one must be careful when interpreting the results 
of the impulse-response functions because they do not only convey isolated relations among pairs 
of variables. One could in principle trace down the transmission looking at the full set of IRF to 
each of the structural shocks. For instance, in the example above, one could look at the IRF of 
output  to  an  expenditure  shock  to  gauge  the  sign  and  significance  of  the  multiplier  and 
decompose the direct and indirect transmission of a disaster to output. However, as discussed 
above,  while  the  assumptions  for  the  identification  of  the  impact  of  disasters  and  other 
exogenous variables are relatively uncontroversial, identifying fiscal shocks from causal ordering 
using  annual  data  has  many  pitfalls.  Thus,  the  impulse  responses  to  structural  shock  to 
endogenous variables must be taken with caution.  
In addition, one may argue that  disaster effects could be endogenous to  the level of 
income due to better mitigation expenses and mitigation measures. This could then introduce 
heterogeneity in the response parameters  across countries. We address this heterogeneity by 15 
 
comparing results across subsamples based on income levels and other relevant characteristics.
8 
Considering the implications that disaster mitigation measures may have on the classification of 
disasters, we use a measure of disasters that includes only those above some threshold. Thus, an 
event occurring in a country, which has engaged actively in mitigation, that does not have 
impact on the stock of wealth, capital or people is not classified as a disaster. 
    
5.  Results 
This section presents and discusses in detail the estimated impact of natural disasters on output, 
fiscal expenditures, fiscal revenues, and the deficit. Other macroeconomic variables, like inflation 
and interest rates, are included in the estimation to control for their behavior around disasters 
but  we  do  not  discuss  their  response  to  disasters  for  reasons  of  space.  For  the  baseline 
estimation, the appendix reports the full set of impulse-response functions. We first discuss the 
baseline results for the full sample of countries included in the analysis. We then document the 
differential responses across income levels, proxies for the fiscal space, and the development of 
financial and insurance markets. The appendix presents a detailed discussion of the impact of 
disasters for different regions. 
5.1 Baseline Results 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative impulse response functions of real per capita GDP, government 
deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues. Since the variables are expressed in 
logs, the non-cumulative IRF show the percentage deviation of the variable with respect to its 
trend level at each point in time, and the cumulative IRFs displayed in the figure show the 
cumulative percentage deviation of a variable at each moment. In the long-run, the cumulative 
IRFs show the total percentage deviation of the variable from its trend resulting from a shock. 
In  this  and  most  figures  below,  government  expenditures  and  revenues  are  expressed  as  a 
fraction of government deficit using the sample average shares of each deficit component. This 
means that the evolution of the deficit can be directly obtained by subtracting the evolution of 
                                                           
8 One can also compare the results across countries with different histories of disasters incidence assuming 
that those with higher historical incidence would have made more mitigation expenses. This is left for 
future research. 16 
 
expenditures and revenues.
9 This evolution is the one shown in the second column of graphs, 
because the deficit is not directly part of the model specified in equation (1).  Obtaining the 
evolution of deficit as a fraction of GDP only requires subtracting the evolution of real GDP 
from the evolution of the deficit. 
In the average middle- and high-income country, all three types of disasters  appear to 
have a negative impact on GDP (Figure 1, first column) but none of the effects is estimated as 
statistically significant. There is some indication that the impact of geological disasters on GDP 
could be more significant than the effects of climatic and other disasters . Note again that the 
residual disaster category is qualitatively different from the other two, so the impact of these 
disasters must be taken with care. Consistently, we will  henceforth put more emphasis in the 
discussion of the better-defined geological and climatic disasters.
10 
Fiscal variables respond to disasters. The impulse  responses reported in Figure 1 show 
the evolution of government expenditures and revenues as a share of government deficit, so that 
the difference between these two series measures the impact o f the shock on the deficit. The 
evolution of the deficit computed in this way is also reported in the second column of the figure. 
Government expenditure increases significantly in response to climatic and geological disasters, 
where  the  former  cumulative  response  lasts relatively longer. On the contrary, expenditures 
contract strongly after a residual disaster. Revenues experience an insignificant  change after all 
disasters.  
                                                           
9  By  definition,  the  deficit  is  the  difference  between  expenditures  and  revenues:  D E R .  Log-
linearizing this expression, the log deviations of deficit correspond to  ˆ ˆˆ ER d s e s r , where  E s  and  R s  
are the shares of expenditures and revenues on deficit:  / E s E D  and the lowercase letters with hats 
represent the log deviation of a variable with respect to its trend. 
10 The impact of disasters is significantly negative when we use the money market rate as the relevan t 
interest rate. Although money market rates are better measures of the policy stance than our “merged” 
interest rate measure, their country coverage is limited and reduce the sample to about one half and 
biases it toward upper middle and higher income countries. Given the differences documented by income 
level below, using this interest rate measure may bias the interpretation of our results as applying to the 
“average” country.  17 
 
The  combination  of  the  significant  increase  in  expenditures  and  rather  unchanged 
revenues  after  a  climatic  shock  leads  to  an  important  increase  in  government  deficit  (25% 
increase in real terms). After a geological disaster, the increases in expenditures and revenues 
cancel out, resulting in an insignificant movement in the level of the deficit. Since the output is 
not  changing  significantly  the  deficit  increases  as  a  share  of  GDP.  Somewhat  surprisingly, 
deficits decline in real per capita terms after other types of disasters.  This decline is larger and 
significant in contrast to the decline in GDP, so that the deficit declines relative to GDP too. As 
mentioned above, this may just reflect the heterogeneity and sparsity of the disasters included 
in this category. 
Several of these results are similar to those obtained using a specification in differences 
(Figure 2), where the estimates suggest strong negative effect of geological disasters on GDP 
and short-lasting negative impact of the residual disasters on output. In this case, the responses 
of  expenditures  to  climatic  and  geological  disasters  are  smaller  and  less  significant.  The 
conclusions  regarding  the  deficit  are  thus  less  certain.  However,  it  appears  that  the  deficit 
increases after a climatic disasters relatively more than after a geological disaster (with the 
opposite sign, showing rather a contraction of the deficit), and is insignificant but changes sign 
after other disasters. 
Overall, the baseline results imply that GDP could decline after geological disaster but is 
in general not significantly affected by disasters. In contrast, clear budget consequences follow 
climatic  disasters.  These  consequences  come  from  an  expansion  of  the  expenditure  and 
unchanged revenues after these episodes. It seems that governments actively try to attenuate 
the impact of these disasters by incurring deficit financing. Coincidently, the output impact of 
climatic shocks could be the smallest. Following a geological disaster, expenditures and revenues 
move in similar directions, resulting in a little budget adjustment. After a typical geological 
disaster, fluctuations in expenses are highly correlated with fiscal revenues. Governments do not 
massively resort to deficit financing after a geological disaster and this seems to end in higher 
real  consequences  for  these  disasters.  This  lack  of  deficit  financing  may  be  due  to  demand 
factors (government choice) or because of a small fiscal space. Results below controlling for the 
level of initial debt and financial market development will shed more light on the merit of these 
two interpretations. 18 
 
5.2 Robustness 
There were several modeling choices made in the estimation of the baseline results. This section 
briefly explores the robustness of the results to these choices. The discussion above already 
showed that the use of a model in levels or differences does not importantly affect the results. In 
what follows we explore the role of the number of lags, the measure of disasters, the measure of 
output, and the order of the variables in the VAR. 
The results of each of these exercises, reported in figures 3 to 7 show that the findings 
discussed above are not crucially driven by these modeling choices. Adding a third lag turns 
positive the point estimate for the GDP impact of climatic disasters, but as in the previous case, 
the  impact  is  not  statistically  significant  (Figure  3).  The  conclusions  regarding  deficits, 
expenditures, and revenues are largely unaffected. 
We use two different indicators of the occurrence of disasters. First, a simple index that 
takes the value 1 if at least one disaster of each category took place in a given year (Figure 4, 
Panel A). Second, a more complex index that takes into account the month when the disaster 
occurs, thus reporting the impact of a disaster occurring January 1
st (Figure 4, Panel B). In 
both  cases,  the  output  and  fiscal  impacts  of  disasters  are  similar  to  those  reported  in  the 
baseline results. Similar results are also obtained when using the Penn World Tables’ measure of 
real per capita GDP that adjusts for purchasing power parity instead of the measure in constant 
dollars (Figure 5). 
As explained in section 3, the baseline estimation in levels included the changes in the 
(log)  interest  rate  instead  of  the  level  of  this  variable  because  in  some  cases  its  impulse 
responses  suggested  non-stationary  behavior.  While  this  choice  makes  a  difference  for  the 
estimated responses of this variable, it does not importantly affect the estimated responses of 
output and the fiscal variables to disasters, as shown in Figure 6.   
Finally, changing the order of variables in the VAR, so that expenditures are located 
after output inflation, and interest rates, and just before revenues, does not change the main 
results either (Figure 7). 19 
 
Overall, these exercises indicate that the broad patterns documented above are robust 
features of the data and do not depend crucially on specific modeling choices. In what follows, 
we will focus only on the baseline model estimated in levels because of its precision relative to 
the model in differences. 
5.3 The Impact of Disasters across Income Levels 
The  baseline  results  group  all  middle  and  high-income  countries  together.  As  discussed  in 
section 3, this increases the number of disasters included in the sample, raising the statistical 
power  of  the  procedure.  The  cost  is  that  assuming  homogeneity  in  the  parameters  may 
significantly bias the estimates. A possible way of advancing in allowing heterogeneity, while 
retaining  statistical  power,  is  to  estimate  separately  the  model  for  groups  of  relatively 
homogeneous countries. One straightforward manner of grouping countries is according to their 
per-capita income level, which proxies for their overall level of development. The results of this 
exercise are reported below. 
Climatic and Geological disasters have no significant output impact among high-income 
countries as in the whole sample (Figure 8, first column). Climatic disasters appear to rather 
induce  a  small  increase  in  output  which  is  however  close  to  zero  and  insignificant  from  a 
statistical perspective. Geological disasters have a cumulative output effect of about 5 percent 
(similarly as for the baseline) that is not significant either. The only large significant impact is 
that  of  other  disasters.  However,  as  shown  in  Table  1,  there  is  very  few  and  concentrated 
episodes of Geological and Other disasters among high-income countries. The only country in 
this group that has experienced large geological disasters is Greece, in three occasions, and the 
only country affected by other disasters is Barbados. Only for climatic disasters there is enough 
statistical variation for identification (27 disasters spread across several countries). Thus, the 
results for Geological and Other disasters in this group of countries are unlikely to be reliable 
and we will focus on Climatic disasters for the discussion next. 
On  the  fiscal  side,  both  expenditures  and  revenues  increase  after  a  climatic  disaster 
(Columns (3) and (4)). This comovement results in insignificant impacts on the budget deficit. 
This suggests that high-income countries are likely increasing their expenditures and revenues in 20 
 
response to a Climatic disaster. They can mitigate the impact of these shocks without going into 
deficit financing, presumably due to a positive multiplier effect of public expenditures. 
The situation is different for middle-income countries (Figure 9). The output impact of 
disasters appears larger for this group, with a cumulative output decline of about 0.9 percent for 
climatic  disasters  and  about  7  percent  for  Geological  disasters,  where  only  the  latter  is 
statistically significant. Contrarily to high-income countries, in this (larger) group of countries, 
there are many episodes of disasters across several countries, so the results are not driven by a 
single country or a cluster of episodes. On the fiscal side, disasters are typically associated with 
significant increases in expenditures after climatic and geological disasters. These increases reach 
about 17 and 60 percent of the average budget deficit after a climatic and geological disaster, 
respectively. On the revenue side, there are differences between climatic and geological disasters. 
While  the  revenue  declines  by  about  18  percent  of  the  deficit  after  a  climatic  disaster,  it 
increases by about 30 percent after a geological disaster. As a result, the cumulative budget 
deficit increases by about 30 percent following a climatic disaster  and by about 30 percent after 
a geological disaster, but only after a climatic disaster this increase is statistically significant. Of 
course, given the decline in output, the cumulative-deficit increase as a fraction of GDP would 
be higher. 
Overall,  governments  in  middle-income  countries  react  to  disasters  by  increasing 
expenditures and relying on deficit financing, thus increasing their overall debt levels. However, 
despite these attempts, the disasters still result in important output costs that further reduce 
their ability to service debt, presumably due to a small fiscal multiplier and a larger direct 
impact of disasters on economic activity relative to high-income countries. 
In our sample, the group of middle-income countries encompasses 73 countries. It is thus 
possible that the group is still too heterogeneous and that the responses discussed above may be 
contaminated by this heterogeneity. To further check for this possibility we separated this group 
into two sub-groups of lower- and higher-middle-income countries, again following the World 
Bank classification. The results are reported in figures 10 and 11. 
Lower-middle-income countries are much more heavily affected by disasters than higher-
middle-income ones. In the former group, a climatic disaster results in a 4 percent cumulative 21 
 
output decline, while in the latter it leads to an output increase of similar magnitude. Likewise, 
geological disasters lead to a 15 percent cumulative output decline among lower-middle-income 
countries and to a negligible decline among higher middle-income countries. The small change in 
higher-middle-income  countries  following  a  geological  disaster  is  not  very  robust  and  when 
looking at the specification in differences there is a similar decline to that for lower-middle-
income countries. However, the increase following a climatic disaster in higher-middle-income 
countries persists across specifications and is unlikely to be driven by specific episodes because 
there are 77 episodes of climatic disasters among the 28 countries in this group. 
Although  it  may  initially  look  contradictory,  it  is  worth  reminding  that  from  a 
theoretical  point  of  view,  the  impact  of  a  disaster  on  economic  activity  is  ambiguous,  as 
discussed in section 4. Thus, one possible interpretation of these findings is that, among higher-
middle-income countries the wealth effect associated with a disaster and the positive multiplier 
of  government  expenditures  dominate  the  factor  destruction  effect,  leading  to  a  slowly 
accumulating increase in output. 
On the fiscal side, there are completely opposite responses to disasters between these two 
groups  of  middle-income  countries.    Lower-middle-income  countries  reduce  (increase) 
expenditure and revenue after a climatic (geological) disaster. Higher-middle-income countries 
follow an opposite pattern for climatic disasters. However, these different patterns yield similar 
results for the behavior of the budget deficit. In both groups of countries, the deficit increases 
after  a  climatic  disaster,  although  the  increase  is  larger  and  more  significant  among  lower-
middle-income ones (30 percent versus 20 percent). The increase in deficit after a geological 
disaster is not significant in both cases, although the point estimate is also considerably higher 
among lower-middle-income countries (50 percent increase versus 10 percent decline).  
Overall, these results suggest that most of the previous conclusions regarding middle-
income countries are driven by the behavior of lower-middle-income ones. In these countries, 
governments react to disasters by engaging in deficit financing and increasing debt, but are still 
more affected by the disasters on the real side, further reducing their ability to repay. This 
coincides with the common observation that relatively poorer countries have lower capacity to 
efficiently and effectively execute government expenditures. Of course, another possibility is that 22 
 
the direct output-impact of disasters could be higher among these countries. For instance, a 
smaller  stock  of  capital  in  lower-middle-income  countries  could  be  associated  with  a  higher 
marginal product of capital, so the output losses associated with a decline in the capital stock 
would be higher. Another possibility is that the wealth effects that push for an increase in 
output after a disaster are smaller among these countries.   
5.4 Does Indebtedness Affect a Country’s Response to Disasters? 
The previous results suggest that middle-income countries, especially the poorer ones engage in 
deficit financing after a disaster without being able to mitigate the impact of these events on the 
real side of the economy. However, even the ability to engage in deficit financing of expenditure 
will likely depend on a country’s debt level, its access to domestic or international debt markets, 
and the ability to raise revenues through taxation. In this section we shed light on the role of 
initial debt on a country’s ability to engage in deficit financing by comparing the output and 
fiscal response to disasters of countries with different initial levels of total government debt. 
Despite government debt being an important macroeconomic variable, data on total debt 
levels is relatively scarce and available for few countries in recent years only. Thus, looking at 
the role of debt severely reduces the sample of countries under consideration. With this caveat 
in mind, the results of this exercise are reported in Figure 12. 
Contrary to expectations, countries with high levels of initial debt  (Panel B) do not 
suffer more from disasters than those with low levels of debt (Panel A). Climatic shocks induce 
similar  output  declines  in  the  two  groups,  and  Geological  disasters  have  larger  impact  on 
countries with lower initial debt levels (Panel A).  Also, despite similar declines in revenue after 
a climatic disaster, countries with higher initial levels of debt expand government expenditures 
relatively more and run higher increases in the deficit. Only for Geological Disasters there is a 
larger  deficit  increase  among  countries  with  lower  debt  levels,  but  this  larger  increase  is 
associated with a larger decline in revenue relative to countries with higher debt levels. At least 
in this sample, it seems that initial debt levels do not constrain a government’s fiscal space. This 
apparent paradox is partly explained by the composition of countries in the sample with high 
and low debt levels. There are many more high-income countries among those with high initial 
debt levels than among those with low initial debt levels. Also, among upper-middle-income 23 
 
countries, those with higher initial debt levels have higher income per capita than those with 
lower debt. The average GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) among countries with high debt is 
about 9900 dollars but only 8600 dollars for countries with lower initial debt. At least in this 
sample,  governments  of  relatively  richer  countries  have  enjoyed  better  access  to  debt.  This 
access seems to be serially correlated, so that good access in the past signals for good access in 
the future rather than a reduced fiscal space. 
To check to what extent these differences are driven by income levels we estimated a 
variation of the model described in equation (1) that instead of splitting the sample in two 
groups allows the impact of external shocks to vary parametrically with the initial level of debt 
and a country’s level of income.  This means that the  j B  matrices in equation (1), and the 
block of the   j A  matrices associated with the terms-of-trade fluctuations will vary with the 
levels of debt and income. After estimating this model, it is possible to construct the IRF for 
countries with high and low levels of debt controlling for differences in income. Figure 13 reports 
these IRFs. Each of the panels in the figure reports the impact of a type of disaster on output 
and  fiscal  variables  for  hypothetical  countries  with  low  and  high  debt  levels  (25
th  and  75
th 
percentile  of  the  debt  to  GDP  ratios  across  sample  countries),  along  their  one  standard 
deviation confidence bands. These figures show that the patterns documented above survive 
controlling  for  differences  in  average  income levels.  Countries  with  higher  initial debt  levels 
experience a smaller decline in GDP after a geological disaster, a larger expansion of government 
expenditures and a smaller (no) contraction of revenues after all types of disasters. In sum, the 
conjecture raised above that high initial debt levels are probably proxying for better access to 
funds in this sample is not rejected by controlling for differences in average GDP per capita. 
5.5 Financial Development and Insurance Penetration 
A disaster typically affects a country’s productive capacity by destroying physical and human 
capital. Replacing that capital is costly and may take time (especially in the case of damages to 
infrastructure). While there is no way around the time to rebuild capital and infrastructure, and 
human  capital  lost  may  never  be  replaced,  having  quick  access  to  financial  resources  will 
certainly reduce the time it takes to reconstruct a country’s productive capacity. Even though 
governments may try to provide relief and resources for this reconstruction, a large part of it 24 
 
will likely come from private sources. Therefore, having a well-developed financial system that 
can finance the reconstruction ex-post or that can gather and price the risks ex-ante through 
insurance schemes may substantially reduce the need for government financing in the aftermath 
of a disaster, and make government spending more productive.
11 Next, we study the relation 
between financial and insurance market development,  and the consequences of disasters in 
relation to  government financing and output  (GDP) by grouping countries according to the 
development of these markets and comparing the impact of disasters across these groups. To 
maintain as many observations and disasters as possible in each group ,  we  first  divide our 
sample between countries wit h measures of financial development and insurance penetration 
above and below the sample median respectively. 
Climatic and geological shocks have a large negative output impact on countries with 
low levels of financial development, as measured by the avera ge ratio of private credit to GDP 
from 1975 to 2008 (Figure 14). Among these countries, a climatic shock results in a cumulative 
output decline of almost  2 percent, and a geological disaster results in a decline of about  9 
percent. In contrast, among more  financially developed countries a climatic disaster has  a 
positive impact on output while a geological disaster has no impact on output.
12 
There is no increase in government expenditure after climatic disasters in financially 
underdeveloped countries, but a large, significant increase of  60 percent of the average budget 
deficit among more financially developed ones (Figure 14, Panel B, column 3). The latter occurs 
despite possible contraction in revenues of about 30 percent of the average deficit. As a resul t, 
the budget deficit increases importantly in financially developed countries, and only modestly 
and not significantly among financially underdeveloped ones. There is no qualitative difference 
in the fiscal response to geological disasters between the two groups. 
                                                           
11 For instance, this may happen by allowing the government to focus on relief and public good provision 
instead of providing subsidized credits for the private sector. 
12 This result is not robust to changes in the variable used for interest rates. When using only the money 
market rates (with the corresponding reduction in the sample), there is a decline in output as a result of a 
geological disaster, and only a small impact for climatic disasters.   25 
 
Controlling for income does not change the conclusions. The comparison of the responses 
to  disasters  of  GDP  and  fiscal  variables  in  countries  with  high  and  low  levels  of  financial 
development (25
th and 75
th sample percentiles, respectively) in Figure 15 confirms that more 
financially developed countries suffer smaller output contractions after disasters, although the 
differences  are  not  significant.  The  figure  also  confirms  that  expenditures  always  expand  in 
financially developed countries, and revenues expand after a geological disaster and contract 
after  a  climatic  disaster.  As  before,  deficits  always  increase  relatively  more  in  financially 
developed countries. 
These  results  suggest  that  governments  can  borrow  more  easily  in  more  financially 
developed  countries,  and  that  the  real  consequences  of  shocks,  at  least  the  more  frequent 
climatic ones, are smaller. This is consistent with the financial system facilitating resources both 
for  government  financing  (e.g.  by  allowing  the  issuance  of  domestic  debt)  and  for  private 
reconstruction. Having access to the resources, which can be mobilized by an efficient financial 
system, helps dealing with disasters. This is confirmed by unreported results that interest rates 
also decline in financially developed  countries following a climatic shock (while they remain 
unaltered  among  financially  underdeveloped  countries),  and  suggests  that  the  larger  deficit 
expansion in these countries does not necessarily lead to a larger increase in government debt 
burdens or concerns about excessive debt burden that would significantly increase the interest 
rate risk premium for governments. Looking at the differential response of interest payments 
across  these  groups  of  countries  would  be  an  interesting  exercise  that  we  leave  for  future 
research. 
The  results  are  different  when  countries  are  compared  according  to  the  degree  of 
insurance penetration, as measured by the total value of premiums to GDP (Figure 16). It is 
important to keep in mind that data on insurance penetration is not widely available so the 
subset of countries with data is biased toward higher-income countries. Thus, the important 
aspect of this exercise is the comparison between the two groups rather than the estimated 
responses for each individual group. Comparing the real consequences of shocks, countries with 
relatively  low  insurance  penetration  (Panel  A)  suffer  larger  output  declines  in  response  to 
climatic and geological disasters than countries with high insurance penetration (Panel B). At 
the same time, deficits increase considerably more in countries with low insurance penetration. 26 
 
In countries with high insurance penetration, expenditures and revenues move closer together 
resulting in a small change in the fiscal deficit. 
Most  of  these  patterns  survive  controlling  for  differences  in  income  (Figure  17). 
Countries with low insurance penetration suffer significantly more after disasters (first column) 
and  increase  expenses  relatively  more  (although  this  difference  is  not  significant).  The  only 
difference  is  that  while  revenues  decline  relatively  more  for  countries  with  low  insurance 
penetration  after  climatic  disasters,  they  move  similarly  in  both  groups  after  a  geological 
disaster.  As a result, deficits increase relatively more after a climatic disaster for countries with 
low insurance penetration, but increase relatively less after a geological disaster. Nonetheless, 
when computed as a fraction of GDP, deficits always increase relatively more for countries with 
low insurance penetration. 
Overall, countries with low insurance penetration expand their government deficit after 
disasters but do not manage to reduce the negative consequences of disasters as much as in 
those countries with high insurance penetration. One likely interpretation of these findings is 
that  countries  with  high  insurance  penetration  can  quickly  allocate  resources  from  existing 
insurances to recover productive capacity and little fiscal effort is required to dampen the macro 
consequences  of  these  events.  Fiscal  resources  can  then  be  devoted  to  relief,  and  the 
simultaneous  increase  in  expenditures  and  revenues  suggests  that  the  fiscal  effort  is  mainly 
redistributive  (e.g.  providing  relief  to  those  affected  by  increasing  revenues  from  those  not 
affected by the disaster).  
Finally,  a  comparison  of  these  results  with  those  obtained  comparing  countries  with 
different levels of financial development show that these two dimensions play different roles in 
the transmission of disasters to the fiscal side. While countries with high financial development 
or high insurance penetration suffer relatively less from disasters in terms of output decline, a 
developed financial system allows governments to borrow and finance a deficit at likely low 
interest rates to reduce the real consequences of disasters. In contrast, countries with high levels 
of insurance penetration can deal with these real macro consequences without engaging in deficit 
financing  of  their expenditures.  It  seems,  therefore, that  while  overall  financial  development 
helps deal with disasters, the prevalence of insurance does it in a more efficient ex-post manner. 27 
 
Of course, insurance has an ex-ante cost that must be considered for welfare comparisons, but 
this is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper estimated the implications of natural disasters for public finances by analyzing the 
cumulative responses of government expenditures, revenues and fiscal deficit to disaster shocks. 
We found that climatic, geological and other disasters have an important negative impact on 
the  fiscal  stance  by  decreasing  output  and increasing  deficits, especially  so  in  lower-middle-
income countries. When controlling for income, there is no clear relation between initial debt 
and the fiscal impact of disasters. In our sample, countries that were more indebted seem to be 
those with better access to debt, so that debt levels proxy for better access to capital markets 
rather  than  constrained  fiscal  space.  Further,  countries  with  more  developed  financial  or 
insurance markets suffer less from disasters in terms of output declines. The way this is achieved 
differs in each case, though. In financially developed markets, governments are able to raise 
funds and increase deficits. And presumably, this response helps alleviate the impact of the 
disasters.  In  contrast,  in  countries  with  high  insurance  penetration,  the  smaller  impact  of 
disasters  on  GDP  occurs  without  an  important  fiscal  expansion.  Countries  with  smaller 
insurance markets expand deficits more, yet still suffer more from disasters. It seems that the 
availability of insurance reduces the real consequences without requiring an increase in fiscal 
burdens.  By  extending  the  implication  of  this  finding,  financial  markets  and  development 
institutions could help in development and penetration of fiscal insurance policies or hedging 
debt instruments to further diminish disaster consequences. The future research could focus on 
better identification of the fiscal responses to disasters and the implied consequences for fiscal 
stance  by  employing  higher  frequency  (quarterly)  data,  and  increasing  the  homogeneity  of 
countries in the analyzed sample and exploiting the potential efficiency gains through the use of 
appropriate estimation methods.   
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East Asia Pacific and South Asia
China 901 0.156 0.144 -0.011 2 65 0 22
Fiji 1,803 0.285 0.244 -0.042 0 17 0 24
Indonesia 640 0.192 0.185 -0.007 2 1 3 30
Korea, Rep. 5,704 0.162 0.175 0.013 0 1 0 23
Malaysia 2,545 0.291 0.243 -0.048 0 0 0 25
Philippines 942 0.166 0.153 -0.014 2 58 0 29
Sri Lanka 568 0.297 0.197 -0.100 0 29 0 26
Thailand 1,404 0.168 0.161 -0.007 0 20 0 27
Total 1,734 0.214 0.187 -0.027 6 191 3 206
Europe and Central Asia
Albania 1,303 0.303 0.232 -0.071 0 3 0 14
Azerbaijan 933 0.261 0.217 -0.044 1 4 0 15
Belarus 1,462 0.293 0.322 0.028 0 1 0 16
Bulgaria 1,754 0.351 0.349 -0.002 0 2 0 17
Croatia 5,171 0.363 0.361 -0.001 0 3 0 13
Czech Republic 5,827 0.341 0.317 -0.024 0 2 0 14
Georgia 842 0.250 0.208 -0.042 1 3 0 12
Hungary 4,399 0.499 0.456 -0.043 0 3 0 26
Kazakhstan 1,402 0.238 0.222 -0.016 0 1 0 13
Latvia 3,741 0.373 0.359 -0.014 0 1 0 14
Lithuania 3,814 0.346 0.317 -0.030 0 1 0 13
Macedonia, FYR 1,775 0.372 0.360 -0.012 0 2 1 15
Moldova 410 0.318 0.307 -0.011 0 3 0 12
Poland 4,034 0.334 0.301 -0.034 0 1 0 17
Romania 1,705 0.324 0.286 -0.038 0 2 0 7
Russian Federation 2,101 0.169 0.183 0.014 0 1 0 13
Slovak Republic 4,222 0.438 0.380 -0.058 0 2 0 12
Slovenia 10,388 0.471 0.462 -0.009 0 2 0 13
Turkey 3,559 0.237 0.175 -0.062 3 2 0 15
Ukraine 795 0.334 0.309 -0.025 0 3 0 15
Total 3,039 0.338 0.313 -0.025 5 42 1 286
Western Europe and North America
Austria 17,636 0.372 0.333 -0.039 0 0 0 22
Belgium 17,256 0.493 0.429 -0.064 0 0 0 24
Denmark 23,307 0.381 0.368 -0.013 0 2 0 26
France 20,372 0.521 0.490 -0.032 0 2 0 25
Greece 9,497 0.289 0.201 -0.088 3 2 0 22
Luxembourg 29,981 0.407 0.431 0.024 0 4 0 17
Netherlands 20,934 0.513 0.487 -0.026 0 1 0 25
Portugal 7,939 0.406 0.301 -0.105 0 0 0 19
Sweden 23,397 0.371 0.355 -0.016 0 1 0 32
United States 29,635 0.205 0.180 -0.025 0 3 0 27
Total 20,331 0.394 0.357 -0.037 3 15 0 239
Midle East, North Affrica, and Sub-Saharan Africa
Algeria 1,783 0.311 0.308 -0.003 0 1 0 17
Botswana 2,575 0.395 0.462 0.067 0 9 2 29
Cameroon 721 0.174 0.186 0.012 1 2 0 28
Cape Verde 1,280 0.365 0.301 -0.064 0 2 1 13
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1,099 0.376 0.342 -0.034 1 0 0 28
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2,025 0.455 0.410 -0.045 2 0 0 5
Israel 16,212 0.523 0.425 -0.097 0 1 0 19
Jordan 1,748 0.368 0.240 -0.128 0 4 0 27
Table 1. Summary Statistics













Table 1. Summary Statistics
Mean Number of Events
Number of 
Observations
Lebanon 3,707 0.294 0.116 -0.178 0 1 0 5
Lesotho 383 0.437 0.443 0.006 0 6 0 16
Mauritius 2,849 0.237 0.211 -0.025 0 6 1 26
Morocco 1,191 0.320 0.251 -0.069 1 3 0 22
Namibia 2,508 0.299 0.298 -0.002 0 5 0 6
Seychelles 6,106 0.538 0.473 -0.065 1 1 0 19
South Africa 3,218 0.267 0.237 -0.031 0 6 1 29
Swaziland 1,079 0.281 0.276 -0.005 0 12 0 27
Syrian Arab Republic 1,042 0.314 0.253 -0.061 0 1 0 21
Tunisia 1,595 0.340 0.309 -0.031 0 1 0 16
Total 2,747 0.340 0.306 -0.034 6 61 5 354
Latin America and Caribbean
Argentina 7,692 0.204 0.200 -0.004 0 3 0 15
Bahamas, The 15,611 0.188 0.174 -0.014 0 5 0 15
Barbados 8,304 0.320 0.285 -0.035 0 3 1 25
Belize 2,844 0.293 0.244 -0.049 0 7 0 25
Bolivia 1,039 0.255 0.165 -0.090 0 10 0 19
Brazil 3,408 0.276 0.264 -0.012 0 4 0 16
Chile 3,271 0.246 0.249 0.003 2 7 0 23
Colombia 2,393 0.277 0.263 -0.014 3 7 0 24
Costa Rica 3,281 0.163 0.134 -0.029 2 8 0 28
Dominican Republic 2,502 0.130 0.130 0.000 0 3 0 14
El Salvador 2,326 0.181 0.160 -0.021 2 4 1 10
Grenada 2,998 0.294 0.263 -0.031 0 0 0 5
Guatemala 1,607 0.120 0.100 -0.020 0 6 0 30
Guyana 882 0.412 0.346 -0.066 0 2 1 3
Honduras 1,121 0.210 0.164 -0.046 0 17 0 24
Jamaica 3,487 0.260 0.254 -0.006 0 1 0 11
Mexico 5,424 0.258 0.229 -0.029 1 8 1 29
Nicaragua 805 0.227 0.164 -0.063 0 1 0 7
Panama 3,395 0.237 0.236 -0.001 1 2 0 14
Paraguay 1,415 0.159 0.157 -0.002 0 4 0 13
Peru 2,077 0.176 0.143 -0.033 1 11 2 32
St. Lucia 2,620 0.270 0.245 -0.025 0 2 0 10
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2,264 0.330 0.286 -0.043 0 2 0 21
Uruguay 5,929 0.263 0.244 -0.019 0 3 0 29
Venezuela, RB 5,320 0.221 0.234 0.013 0 1 0 27
Total 3,840 0.231 0.207 -0.024 12 121 6 469
The table provides descriptive statistics for each country, grouped by regions. Mean values are reported for real GDP per capita, and for government
expenditures, government revenue and government deficit as a fraction of the GDP. The number of events by type of disaster, and the number of
observations are also listed.
2Panel A. Unit Root Tests
Variable
LLC test IPS test
Frac. Reject 
(ADF)
LLC test IPS test
Frac. Reject 
(ADF)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita -19.3 -9.2 0.3 -37.0 -27.5 0.8
Government Expenditures -3.7 -2.3 0.2 -31.7 -29.9 0.8
Government Revenues -5.6 -3.9 0.2 -26.1 -27.6 0.8
Inflation -52.2 -28.7 0.6 -- -- --
Interest Rate -4.6 -2.5 0.2 -50.8 -33.4 0.9
Terms of Trade -6.9 -5.2 0.3 -39.4 -39.4 1.0
Alt. hypothesis: common AR coefs.
Statistic Prob.
Panel v-Statistic -0.72 0.76
Panel rho-Statistic 11.54 1.00
Panel PP-Statistic -0.19 0.42
Panel ADF-Statistic -1.50 0.07
Alt. hypothesis: individual AR coefs.
Statistic Prob.
Group rho-Statistic 14.97 1.00
Group PP-Statistic -3.64 0.00
Group ADF-Statistic -3.97 0.00
Table 2. Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
Panel B. Panel cointegration tests
Panel A shows the results of country-by-country and panel unit root tests performed for the main series
used in the paper. Columns (1) to (3) show results for the variables in levels, and columns (4) to (6) for
the variables in differences. The exception is inflation, which being the changes in the price level, is just
included in levels. Columns (1) and (4) show the results of the Levin-Lin Chu panel unit root test, and
Columns (2) and (5) the statistics for the Im, Pesaran, and Shin test. Columns (3) and (6) report the
fraction of countries inthe sample in which a standard, country-by-country augmented Dickey Fuller test
could not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. All the tests in level allow for a country-specific
intercept and trend, and those in differences for the country-specific intercept only. Also, all tests use the
Newey-West bandwith selection with the Bartlett kernel for the estimation of the long run variance of
the series. 
The table in Panel B reports the statistic and associated p-value of the different variants of Pedroni's
(1999) panel cointegration test. The null hypothesis in each case is no cointegration.
VAR including TT, GEXP, GDP, GREV, INF, and 
R
Levels Differences
3Geological Climatic Geological Climatic Geological Climatic
Mean
No Disaster 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.033 0.034
Disaster 0.013 0.024 0.036 0.027 0.014 0.028
t-stat
D = ND 0.141 0.569 0.638 0.779 0.636 0.670
ND > D 0.071 0.285 0.681 0.610 0.318 0.335
ND < D 0.929 0.715 0.319 0.390 0.682 0.665
Table 3. Comparing years with and without disasters. Two Sample Mean Tests
The table shows the t-test for the difference on the average growth of GDP, Expenditures and Revenues,
in years when a disaster occurs (Disaster), and in years without disasters (No Disaster). D is the mean of
the sample with at least one disaster, and ND is from the sample with zero disasters.
GDP Growth Expenditures Growth Revenues Growth
4Figure 1. Cumulative Impulse Response Functions of Levels
The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues.
GDP and government deficit are expressed in real per capita terms; government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run
government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come from the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the
interest rate), and including two lags. The order of the endogenous variables entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP,
inflation, interest rate, and government revenues. The model also includes country specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture
global variables. The government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference of revenues and expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve
percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological or other natural disasters occured at time 0 (time in years). The
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5The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues.
GDP and government deficit are expressed in real per capita terms; government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run
government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come from a specification with all variables in differences, and including two lags. The order
of the endogenous variables entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP, inflation, interest rate, and government revenues. The
model also includes time fixed effects that capture global variables. The government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference of revenues and
expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological or other natural
disasters occured at time 0 (time in years). The dotted lines show one standard deviation confidence bands. 
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6Figure 3. Cumulative IRFs Adding Lags
The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues.
GDP and government deficit are expressed in real per capita terms; government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run
government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come from the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the
interest rate), and including three lags. The order of the endogenous variables entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP,
inflation, interest rate, and government revenues. The model also includes country specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture
global variables. The government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference of revenues and expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve
percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological or other natural disasters occured at time 0 (time in years). The
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7Figure 4. Cumulative IFRs Using Different Disaster Indicators
Panel B. Index Considering the Timing of the Disaster
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The figures show the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues.
GDP and government deficit are expressed in real per capita terms; government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run
government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come from the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the interest
rate), and including two lags. The order of the endogenous variables entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP, inflation,
interest rate, and government revenues. The model also includes country specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture global
variables. The government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference of revenues and expenditures. In Panel A, the index used to show the occurence of
disasters takes the value 1 if at least one disaster of each category took place in a given year. In Panel B, this index takes into account the month when the
disaster occurs.The solid lines show the cumulatve percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological or other
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9Figure 5. Cumulative IRFs Using a Different Measure of GDP
The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues.
GDP is expressed in real per capita terms and adjusted for purchasing power parity; government deficit is reported in real per capita terms; government
expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come from the baseline
specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the interest rate), and including two lags. The order of the endogenous variables entered in the
VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP, inflation, interest rate, and government revenues. The model also includes country specific means
and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture global variables. The government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference of revenues and
expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological or other
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10Figure 6. Cumulative IRFs Using Interest Rate Level
The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues.
GDP and government deficit are expressed in real per capita terms; government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run
government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come from the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels, and including
two lags. The order of the endogenous variables entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP, inflation, interest rate, and
government revenues. The model also includes country specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture global variables. The
government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference of revenues and expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve percentage deviation of each
variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological or other natural disasters occured at time 0 (time in years). The dotted lines show one
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11Figure 7. Cumulative IRFs Changing Order in VAR
The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues.
GDP and government deficit are expressed in real per capita terms; government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run
government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come from the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the
interest rate), and including two lags. The order of the endogenous variables entered in the VAR is the following: GDP, inflation, interest rate,
government expenditures and government revenues. The model also includes country specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture
global variables. The government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference of revenues and expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve
percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological or other natural disasters occured at time 0 (time in years). The
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12Figure 8. Cumulative IRFs for High Income Countries
The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues, for
a sample of High Income countries according to the World Bank classification. GDP and government deficit are expressed in real per capita terms;
government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come from
the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the interest rate), and including two lags. The order of the endogenous variables
entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP, inflation, interest rate, and government revenues. The model also includes country
specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture global variables. The government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference of
revenues and expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological
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13Figure 9. Cumulative IRFs for Middle Income Countries
The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues, for
a sample of Middle Income countries according to the World Bank classification. GDP and government deficit are expressed in real per capita terms;
government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come from
the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the interest rate), and including two lags. The order of the endogenous variables
entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP, inflation, interest rate, and government revenues. The model also includes country
specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture global variables. The government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference of
revenues and expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological
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14Figure 10. Cumulative IRFs for Low and Middle Income Countries
The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues, for
a sample of Low and Middle Income countries according to the World Bank classification. GDP and government deficit are expressed in real per capita
terms; government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF
come from the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the interest rate), and including two lags. The order of the endogenous
variables entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP, inflation, interest rate, and government revenues. The model also includes
country specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture global variables. The government deficit is obtained as the weighted
difference of revenues and expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting from a
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15\
Figure 11. Cumulative IRFs for Higher Middle Income Countries
The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues, for
a sample of High and Middle Income countries according to the World Bank classification. GDP and government deficit are expressed in real per capita
terms; government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come
from the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the interest rate), and including two lags. The order of the endogenous
variables entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP, inflation, interest rate, and government revenues. The model also includes
country specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture global variables. The government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference
of revenues and expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological
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16Figure 12 - Cumulative IRFs for Different Debt Levels
Panel B. High Debt Countries
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The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues.
Panels A and B reports the results for countries with debt to GDP ratio below and above the sample median respectively. GDP and government deficit are
expressed in real per capita terms; government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run government deficit. The parameters
used to estimate the IRF come from the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the interest rate), and including two lags. The
order of the endogenous variables entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP, inflation, interest rate, and government revenues.
The model also includes country specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture global variables. The government deficit is obtained as
the weighted difference of revenues and expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting
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18Figure 13 - Cumulative IRFs by Debt Controlling for Income Level
The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues, for
countries with high and low levels of debt controlling for differences in income. The solid lines show the impact of a type of disaster, for countries with
low (thin line) and high (thick line) debt levels (25th and 75th sample percentiles of debt to GDP ratio respectively). The dotted lines show one standard
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19Panel A. Financially Underdeveloped Countries
Panel B. Financially Developed Countries
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The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues.
Panels A and B report the results for countries with the average ratio of private credit to GDP, below and above the sample median respectively. GDP
and government deficit are expressed in real per capita terms; government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run
government deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come from the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the
interest rate), and including two lags. The order of the endogenous variables entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP,
inflation, interest rate, and government revenues. The model also includes country specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture
global variables. The government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference of revenues and expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve
percentage deviation of each variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological or other natural disasters occured at time 0 (time in years). The
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21The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues, for
countries with high and low levels of financial development controlling for differences in income. The solid lines show the impact of a type of disaster,
for countries with low (thin line) and high (thick line) levels of financial development (25th and 75th sample percentiles of average ratio of private credit
to GDP respectively). The dotted lines show one standard deviation confidence bands. 
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22Panel A. Countries with Low Insurance Penetration
Panel B. Countries with High Insurance Penetration
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The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues.
Panels A and B report the results for countries with total value of pemium to GDP ratio below and above the sample median respectively. GDP and
government deficit are expressed in real per capita terms; government expenditures and revenues are expressed as fractions of the long run government
deficit. The parameters used to estimate the IRF come from the baseline specification with all variables expressed in levels (except the interest rate), and
including two lags. The order of the endogenous variables entered in the VAR is the following: government expenditures, GDP, inflation, interest rate, and
government revenues. The model also includes country specific means and trends, and with time fixed effects that capture global variables. The
government deficit is obtained as the weighted difference of revenues and expenditures. The solid lines show the cumulatve percentage deviation of each
variable from its trend resulting from a climatic, geological or other natural disasters occured at time 0 (time in years). The dotted lines show one standard
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24Figure 17 - Cumulative IRFs by Insurance Penetration Controlling for Income Level
The figure shows the cumulative impulse response functions (IRF) for GDP, government deficit, government expenditures, and government revenues, for
countries with high and low levels of insurance penetration controlling for differences in income. The solid lines show the impact of a type of disaster,
for countries with low (thin line) and high (thick line) levels of insurance pentration (25th and 75th sample percentiles of total value of pemium to GDP
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